Taylor Scott International
The Great Deceleration
The emerging-market slowdown is not the beginning of a bust. But it is a turning-point for the world economy Jul 27th 2013 WHEN a champion sprinter falls short of his best speeds, it takes a while to determine whether he is temporarily on poor form or has permanently lost his edge. The same is true with emerging markets, the world economy’s 21st-century sprinters. After a decade of surging growth, in which they led a global boom and then helped pull the world economy forwards in the face of the financial crisis, the emerging giants have slowed sharply. China will be lucky if it manages to hit its official target of 7.5% growth in 2013, a far cry from the double-digit rates that the country had come to expect in the 2000s. Growth in India (around 5%), Brazil and Russia (around 2.5%) is barely half what it was at the height of the boom. Collectively, emerging markets may (just) match last year’s pace of 5%. That sounds fast compared with the sluggish rich world, but it is the slowest emerging-economy expansion in a decade, barring 2009 when the rich world slumped. This marks the end of the dramatic first phase of the emerging-market era, which saw such economies jump from 38% of world output to 50% (measured at purchasing-power parity, or PPP) over the past decade. Over the next ten years emerging economies will still rise, but more gradually. The immediate effect of this deceleration should be manageable. But the longer-term impact on the world economy will be profound. Running out of puff In the past, periods of emerging-market boom have tended to be followed by busts (which helps explain why so few poor countries have become rich ones). A determined pessimist can find reasons to fret today, pointing in particular to the risks of an even more drastic deceleration in China or of a sudden global monetary tightening. But this time a broad emerging-market bust looks unlikely. China is in the midst of a precarious shift from investment-led growth to a more balanced, consumption-based model. Its investment surge has prompted plenty of bad debt. But the central government has the fiscal strength both to absorb losses and to stimulate the economy if necessary. That is a luxury few emerging economies have ever had. It makes disaster much less likely. And with rich-world economies still feeble, there is little chance that monetary conditions will suddenly tighten. Even if they did, most emerging economies have better defences than ever before, with flexible exchange rates, large stashes of foreign-exchange reserves and relatively less debt (much of it in domestic currency). That’s the good news. The bad news is that the days of record-breaking speed are over. China’s turbocharged investment and export model has run out of puff. Because its population is ageing fast, the country will have fewer workers, and because it is more prosperous, it has less room for catch-up growth. Ten years ago China’s per person GDP measured at PPP was 8% of America’s; now it is 18%. China will keep on catching up, but at a slower clip. That will hold back other emerging giants. Russia’s burst of speed was propelled by a surge in energy prices driven by Chinese growth. Brazil sprinted ahead with the help of a boom in commodities and domestic credit; its current combination of stubborn inflation and slow growth shows that its underlying economic speed limit is a lot lower than most people thought. The same is true of India, where near-double-digit annual rises in GDP led politicians, and many investors, to confuse the potential for rapid catch-up (a young, poor population) with its inevitability. India’s growth rate could be pushed up again, but not without radical reforms—and almost certainly not to the peak pace of the 2000s. Many laps ahead The Great Deceleration means that booming emerging economies will no longer make up for weakness in rich countries. Without a stronger recovery in America or Japan, or a revival in the euro area, the world economy is unlikely to grow much faster than today’s lacklustre pace of 3%. Things will feel rather sluggish. It will also become increasingly clear how unusual the past decade was (see article ). It was dominated by the scale of China’s boom, which was peculiarly disruptive not just as a result of the country’s immense size, but also because of its surge in exports, thirst for commodities and build-up of foreign-exchange reserves. In future, more balanced growth from a broader array of countries will cause smaller ripples around the world. After China and India, the ten next-biggest emerging economies, from Indonesia to Thailand, have a smaller combined population than China alone. Growth will be broader and less reliant on the BRICs (as Goldman Sachs dubbed Brazil, Russia, India and China). Corporate strategists who assumed that emerging economies were on a straight line of ultra-quick growth will need to revisit their spreadsheets; in some years a rejuvenated, shale-gas-fired America may be a sprightlier bet than some of the BRICs. But the biggest challenge will be for politicians in the emerging world, whose performance will propel—or retard—growth. So far China’s seem the most alert and committed to reform. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, by contrast, is a dozy resource-based kleptocracy whose customers are shifting to shale gas. India has demography on its side, but both it and Brazil need to recover their reformist zeal—or disappoint the rising middle classes who recently took to the streets in Delhi and São Paulo. There may also be a change in the economic mood music. In the 1990s “the Washington consensus” preached (sometimes arrogantly) economic liberalisation and democracy to the emerging world. For the past few years, with China surging, Wall Street crunched, Washington in gridlock and the euro zone committing suicide, the old liberal verities have been questioned: state capitalism and authoritarian modernisation have been in vogue. “The Beijing consensus” provided an excuse for both autocrats and democrats to abandon liberal reforms. The need for growth may revive interest in them, and the West may even recover a little of its self-confidence. From the print edition: Leaders Continue reading
When Giants Slow Down
The most dramatic, and disruptive, period of emerging-market growth the world has ever seen is coming to its close Jul 27th 2013 THIS year will be the first in which emerging markets account for more than half of world GDP on the basis of purchasing power, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In 1990 they accounted for less than a third of a much smaller total. From 2003 to 2011 the share of world output provided by the emerging economies grew at more than a percentage point a year (see chart 1). The remarkably rapid growth the world has seen in these two decades marks the biggest economic transformation in modern history. Its like will probably never be seen again. According to a recent study by Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler, of the Peterson Institute, a think-tank, from 1960 to the late 1990s just 30% of countries in the developing world for which figures are available managed to increase their output per person faster than America did, thus achieving what is called “catch-up growth”. That catching up was somewhat lackadaisical: the gap closed at just 1.5% a year. From the late 1990s, however, the tables were turned. The researchers found 73% of developing countries managing to outpace America, and doing so on average by 3.3% a year. Some of this was due to slower growth in America; most was not. The most impressive growth was in four of the biggest emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India and China, which Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs, an investment bank, acronymed into the BRICs in 2001. These economies have grown in different ways and for different reasons. But their size marked them out as special—on purchasing-power terms they were the only $1 trillion economies outside the OECD, a rich world club—and so did their growth rates (see chart 2). Mr O’Neill reckoned they would, over a decade, become front-rank economies even when measured at market exchange rates, and he was right. Today they are four of the largest ten national economies in the world. The remarkable growth of emerging markets in general and the BRICs in particular transformed the global economy in many ways, some wrenching. Commodity prices soared and the cost of manufactures and labour sank. Global poverty rates tumbled. Gaping economic imbalances fuelled an era of financial vulnerability and laid the groundwork for global crisis. A growing and vastly more accessible pool of labour in emerging economies played a part in both wage stagnation and rising income inequality in rich ones. The shift towards the emerging economies will continue. But its most tumultuous phase seems to have more or less reached its end. Growth rates in all the BRICs have dropped. The nature of their growth is in the process of changing, too, and its new mode will have fewer direct effects on the rest of the world. The likelihood of growth in other emerging economies having an effect in the near future comparable to that of the BRICs in the recent past is low; they do not have the potential for catch-up the BRICs had in the 1990s and 2000s. And the BRICs’ growth has changed the rest of the world economy in ways that will dampen the disruptive effects of any similar surge in the future. The emerging giants will grow larger, and their ranks will swell; but their tread will no longer shake the Earth as once it did. The great return The BRIC era arrived at the end of a century in which global living standards had diverged remarkably. Towards the end of the 19th century America’s economy overtook China’s to become the largest on the planet. By 1992 China and India—home to 38% of the world’s population—were producing just 7% of the world’s output, while six rich countries which accounted for just 12% of the world’s population produced half of it. In 1890 an average American was about six times better off than the average Chinese or Indian. By the early 1990s he was doing 25 times better. There followed what Mr Subramanian and Mr Kessler call “convergence with a vengeance”. China’s pivot towards liberalisation and global markets came at a propitious time in terms of politics, business and technology. Rich economies were feeling relatively relaxed about globalisation and current-account deficits. Bill Clinton’s America, booming and confident, was little troubled by the growth of Chinese industry or by offshoring jobs to India. And the technology and managerial nous necessary to assemble and maintain complex supply chains were coming into their own, allowing firms to spread their operations between countries and across oceans. The tumbling costs of shipping and communication sparked what Richard Baldwin, an economist at the Graduate Institute in Geneva, calls globalisation’s “second unbundling” (the first was the simple ability to provide consumers in one place with goods from another). As longer supply chains infiltrated and connected places with large and fast-growing working-age populations, enormous quantities of cheap new labour became accessible. According to figures from the McKinsey Global Institute, a think-tank, advanced economies added about 160m non-farm jobs between 1980 and 2010. Emerging economies added 900m. Riding the whirlwind The fruits of this cheap labour were huge steps forward in global trade. Merchandise exports soared from 16% of global GDP in the mid-1990s to 27% in 2008. The Chinese share of global exports topped 11%, with trade accounting for more than half of the country’s GDP. Mr Subramanian and Mr Kessler see China as the first “mega-trader” to grace the world stage since Britain’s imperial heyday. The growth in trade was matched by a growth in demand for commodities as China and the nations supplying it soaked up energy and raw materials such as iron ore, copper and lead (see chart 3). Prices surged, generating a bonanza for the emerging world’s commodity producers and contributing to a broad-based boom, to the great benefit both of fellow-BRICs Russia and Brazil and of smaller economies, including many in Africa. From 1993 to 2007 China averaged growth of 10.5% a year. India, with less reliance on trade, managed an average of 6.5%, more than twice America’s average growth rate. The two countries’ combined share of global output more than doubled to nearly 16%. Global financial imbalances ballooned. From 1999 advanced economies ran a current-account deficit which peaked at nearly 1.2% of rich-world GDP in 2006. Emerging economies’ combined current-account surplus peaked in the same year at 4.9% of GDP. Foreign-exchange interventions made the export surge doubly tricky to manage. After the financial crises of the late 1990s many emerging economies began accumulating dollar reserves to protect themselves against being caught short by big foreign-exchange outflows. Building up reserves helped the growing economies to hold exchange rates below the levels they might otherwise attain, keeping exports relatively cheap. China was a particularly enthusiastic reserve accumulator, and now sits atop a $3.5 trillion hoard, more or less all of it piled up since 2000. All told the BRICs have reserves of about $4.6 trillion. This reserve accumulation contributed to a global savings glut, and the resulting low interest rates encouraged heavy public and private borrowing in the rich world. Some reckon currency manipulation also repressed consumption in emerging markets, so that their exports to big advanced economies like America were not offset by a corresponding rise in consumption of imports. Daron Acemoglu, David Autor and Brendan Price of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, David Dorn, of Madrid’s Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies, and Gordon Hanson, of the University of California, San Diego, argue that the “sag” in employment growth in America in the 2000s can be blamed in large part on the country’s unreciprocated taste for Chinese imports. Not all the effects of the BRICs’ growth were to be felt as promptly; some, for good and ill, will not be experienced in full measure for decades. Bigger economies mean bigger armies. They also mean flourishing universities: in 2030 China may have 50m more science and engineering graduates in its workforce than it did in 2010. And their growth has entailed an historic rise in greenhouse-gas emissions, now a third higher than they were in 1997, as well as heaps of local environmental damage. China is now the world’s largest carbon-dioxide emitter; America is the only non-BRIC in the top four. But though the impact of the recent rapid change will be felt far into the future, the change itself is moderating. Various signs suggest that an important inflection point has been reached. The emerging world will continue to grow in economic importance. But the pace at which it does so will slow as the BRICs put the days of their steepest ascent behind them. Take a deep breath The emerging economies’ share of output is no longer rising as fast as it did in the 2000s. In 2009 the year-on-year increase in that share was almost one and a half percentage points (see chart 1). Now it is back below one percentage point. This tallies with a striking slowdown in BRIC growth rates. In 2007 China’s economy expanded by an eye-popping 14.2%. India managed 10.1% growth, Russia 8.5%, and Brazil 6.1%. The IMF now reckons China will grow by just 7.8% in 2013, India by 5.6%, and Russia and Brazil by 2.5%. Unsurprisingly, this means that the BRIC economies are contributing less to global growth. In 2008 they accounted for two-thirds of world GDP growth. In 2011 they accounted for half of it, in 2012 a bit less than that. The IMF sees them staying at about that level for the next five years. Goldman Sachs predicts that, based on an analysis of fundamentals, the BRICs share will decline further over the long term. Other emerging markets will pick up some of the slack. Yet those markets are not expected to add enough to prevent a general easing of the pace of world growth (see chart 4). After two decades of rapid growth the most populous emerging economies have taken advantage of most of the easiest steps on the ladder to prosperity. An illustration: in 1997 none of the fastest 100 supercomputers in the world was to be found in a BRIC. Now six computers in China grace that list, as do six from other BRICs. And one of them tops it: Tianhe-2, designed and built at the National University of Defence Technology in Changsha, crunches numbers faster than any other device in the world. That is an extraordinary achievement, and the potential for growth as such technology spreads wider is clear. But it is also an indication that the country’s growth will not now be as quick as it used to be. Bleeding-edge innovation is harder than catching up. Other countries have impressive growth potential. Goldman Sachs touts a list of the “Next 11” which includes Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Turkey. But there are various reasons to think that this N11 cannot have an impact on the same scale as that of the BRICs. The first is that these economies are smaller. The N11 has a population of just over 1.3 billion. That is less than half that of the BRICs. The N11 is barely more populous than India, which is the BRIC with the greatest possibility for growth still ahead of it, if only it could reform itself enough to put more of those people to work. The second is that the N11 is richer now than the BRICs were back in the day. Economists reckon that the bigger the gap between a country’s output per person and that of the technological leader, the faster the economy is capable of growing. Weighted by population, the average per person output of the N11 is already 14% of that in America. When the BRIC economies began their economic surge their population-weighted output per person was just 7% of America’s. It is a measure of the continued potential for growth in India, where population has risen fast, that its figure today is still just 8%. It is not just the N11. The world as a whole has less catch-up potential than it used to. Its most populous countries are no longer all that poor and its poor countries are no longer all that populous. Two decades of BRIC-led growth mean that there are far fewer people earning very little. In 1993 about half the world lived at below 5% of American GDP per person, according to an analysis of IMF figures by The Economist (see chart 5). In 2012 the equivalent figure was 18% of American GDP per person. The third reason that the performance of the BRICs cannot be repeated is the very success of that performance. The world economy is much larger than it used to be: twice as big in real terms as it was in 1992, according to IMF figures. That means that emerging markets—whether the BRIC economies or the N11 or both—must deliver larger absolute increases in output to generate a marginal economic boost matching that seen in the 1990s and 2000s. The same maths apply to labour markets. New additions to the workforce will henceforward have a harder time disrupting the global economy. The billion jobs that the McKinsey Global Institute sees as having been added to non-farm employment from 1980 to 2010 boosted it by 115%. If the world were to put on another billion jobs from 2010 to 2040 that would represent just a 51% increase in world employment: impressive but much less dramatic. Making the best of it The reality may be a good bit less dramatic still. Some developing economies will add hundreds of millions of new workers in coming years. But some of that contribution will be offset by the ageing of populations elsewhere. China’s working-age population began shrinking in 2012. India, with more favourable demographics, is struggling to create enough employment; it added no net new jobs between 2004-05 and 2009-10, according to a recent survey. Big demographic booms are brewing elsewhere: Nigeria, for example, may be more populous than America in less than 40 years. But such growth will have its peak impact only decades from now. The way that the world economy reacted to the rise of the BRICs has also made it less prone to further shocks of a similar sort. Markets have responded to soaring commodity demand and prices. Firms and households are saving on inputs; businesses and governments have rushed to develop new resources, as seen in the shale oil-and-gas bonanza now unfolding in North America. Currency adjustments have narrowed deficits. The Chinese yuan has appreciated by roughly 35% against the dollar since 2005. Emerging-world reserve accumulation has diminished along with current-account imbalances. Since 2011 Chinese reserves have been mostly flat. Indeed in recent years reserve outflows have been a problem for some emerging markets. An easing in the stride of the emerging-market giants will be cause for anxiety first and foremost for the residents of those countries, where the growth that has delivered higher living standards has also whetted appetites for more. The transition need not be painful. In China a slower overall growth rate may feel fine to workers if the share of consumption in the economy rises relative to investment. In India, though, the picture is not so pretty. A rising tide may lift all boats; a falling one reveals who has no bathing trunks on. Weaker conditions could place pressure on financial systems in emerging economies about which investors begin to worry. If central banks fail to stem capital outflows then slower growth could give way to outright contraction. Many countries will find that commodities no longer provide a crutch. David Jacks, an economist at Simon Fraser University in British Columbia who studies long-run commodity-price movements, reckons that prices may have already begun a sustained period of below-trend price growth. Internationally, lower growth could focus leaders on increased co-operation and a new push for liberalisation. The BRIC era took place in the absence of major new trade liberalisation (though China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation was an important landmark); with trade growing so healthily anyway, the rewards were harder to appreciate. A slowdown could bring new focus to global trade talks. A deal that addressed non-tariff trade barriers, and especially those on trade in services, could yield big benefits. There is a risk, though, that matters may move in the opposite direction. The rich world is more cautious about globalisation than it was a decade or two ago, and more interested in maintaining its export competitiveness. A century ago the world’s last great era of trade integration ended with a war and ushered in a generation of economic nationalism and international conflict. The recent proliferation of regional trade agreements could signal a move towards fractionalisation of the global economy. And slowed growth in the now-large BRICs could lead to the sort of internal tensions that countries can displace by picking external fights. Whether or not the world can build on a remarkable era of growth will depend in large part on whether the new giants tread a path towards greater global co-operation—or stumble, fall and, in the worst case, fight. From the print edition: Briefing Continue reading
The Economics of Biofuels: Three Drivers
Jim Lane They’re known as the three E’s: emissions, energy security and economic development. But how do they contribute to the economics of biofuels? And how do those economics compare to the economics of crude? The financing of biofuels is founded, to put it as simply as possible, upon the economics of substitution. On the one hand, there’s the price of energy currently locked inside biomass; on the other hand, the price of energy currently locked inside crude oil. The monetary rationale for biofuels is a version of vive la difference. To give a simple example, if renewable sugars are trading at 15 cents per pound, and crude oil is trading at 35 cents a pound — there’s an opportunity for converting sugar to fuels if the refining cost leaves a profit margin worth the agricultural and market risks. Oh, there are enough complicating factors left over to keep a hive of economists busy for a year. There’s the differential in the energy value of, say, ethanol, compared to gasoline or diesel. The impact of losing mass when you blow off the oxygen to turn a sugar into a hydrocarbon. The impact of bioenergy demand on raw biomass prices. The value of co-products from biomass or oil refining. And so on, practically ad infinitum. It takes an advanced degree and a whole bunch of Tylenol to figure it all out. But at the end of the day, the point where substitution makes economic sense is going to correlate back to the price of crude. No matter what the hoped-for margins are, or the opex of a biorefinery, or the capex — it all starts with the barrel. The oil price: 54.40 or fight In looking at the world of cost — an obscuring factor is that oil is generally quoted in a cost per barrel (42 US gallons), while biomass is generally quoted in a price per metric or US ton. To simplify, we have converted everything to US cents per pound. Plus, we’ve used constant dollars, so that you don’t have to constantly factor out inflation. Today, the cost of Brent Crude oil is 35.88 cents per pound, and the IEA forecasts that price will increase to 54.40 cents by 2040. So, here’s the good news or the bad news. If your biomass refining process at scale can beat that price — fully loaded for the raw inputs, capex, opex and margins — you’re going to find a lot of friends in the fuel markets. Barriers? Even if your technology pencils out, there are the “3 Bewares “. 1. Beware ! The technology has not yet reached scale. It may well not have fully de-risked itself, either – being somewhere in the path between concept and scale. 2. Beware ! Qualified investors have more attractive options. No matter how attractive 10 percent returns might be to many investors, they weren’t sufficiently attractive to Chevron in evaluating their own solvent liquefaction technology — compared to 17 percent average corporate returns on capital, primarily from oil & gas exploration. 3. Beware ! Policy and market risk frighten away investors. It could be that the requisite fuel requires a blending mandate to be assured of a market — mandates which may well be unstable. Or they may require flex-fuel vehicles, which may not be in wide supply. And so on. If those barriers are addressed either by your technology (for example, by reaching scale, or producing drop-in fuels that negate the infrastructure risk) — then you may well have the basic economics to compete dollar-for-dollar with crude oil, and win. It’s 54.40 or fight, though. Any technology that can’t compete with crude oil on price — must enter in to the more esoteric and unstable world of what is usually described as the 3 E’s of biofuels – emissions, energy security and economic development. The carbon price Whatever your take on the stability or wisdom of carbon prices, they have arrived in key markets such as Australia and the EU, and particularly in the EU there’s no reason to suppose they are going away any time soon. What’s the value of carbon today? Well, again, we have the problem of carbon credits being generally quoted in euros per metric ton of CO2 avoided. An 8 euro per tonne carbon price works out to 0.65 cents per pound of biofuel — if you assume that an advanced biofuel reduces carbon emissions by 50 percent in a complete lifecycle. That’s not much of an add-on or game-changer — one of the reasons why biofuels developers generally don’t take them into account when developing technology) the other reason is policy instability). But, according to the UK government, carbon prices will begin to bite much more sharply in the next few decades. In fact, by 2040, the UK is projecting a carbon price of 12.27 cents per pound. If you accept their projections — and many may be skeptical — that could raise your threshold “break-even” point with crude oil from 54.40 cents per pound to 66.67 cents, by 2040. That would be of material help. The energy security price Now, what about energy security? What’s the price of avoiding the unrest that being short on fuels brings? Well, there are estimates all over the map. One line of thinking assigns the cost of the US Firth Fleet to the cost of oil — since the Fifth Fleet generally guards the Straits of Hormuz and is dedicated to assuring a flow of oil out of the Gulf. Another, more conservative approach is to assign the cost of fossil energy subsidies as a cost of energy security. Generally, the subsidies are paid out to keep national populations content in a world of unstable and high energy prices — and to keep national economies producing. Those can be thought of as costs associated with being short on energy, or energy insecure. Fortunately, the IEA has been tracking fossil energy subsidies — and it comes out to 3.70 cents per pound, if you assume that half of fossil energy subsidies go to fuel (the IEA says that it is “more than half” and leaves it at that), and that about 80 percent of the barrel goes to fuels (as opposed to chemicals and other co-products). So, if you like to factor in energy security, you might start there, which brings your 2040 target price up to 70.37 cents per pound. Economic development The University of Wisconsin estimates that a biofuels refinery generates $1.82 in statewide economic activity for every $1 in sales. Now, “economic multipliers” can be all over the map — but this is a conservative estimate, on the whole — we’ve seen multipliers well north of 2.0 used in biofuels economics. So, what does that mean? It means that a local biorefinery is going to be worth far more in overall economic impact than just the fuel it sells — and, accordingly, a nation, state, county or town has benefits that range above the direct profits, wages and equipment sales that go into our cents per pound calculation. Making that refinery valuable to the community in terms of economic impact even if it doesn’t generate a profit. Now, that’s a controversial benefit to work into the fuel price equation — because biorefineries are not going to be running at a loss simply because they generate overall benefit to the community. That is, unless they are owned by the community — in the same way that the NFL’s Green Bay Packers are owned by local investors, who have been able to maintain a competitive football team in a relatively small market and in 2011 sold $64 million in stock to local investors who know that “the redemption price is minimal, no dividends are ever paid, [and] the stock cannot appreciate in value.” If you assign all that value into the enterprise — you get some pretty high “break-even” points — 73.22 cents per pound this year, and 128.07 cents per pound in 2040 (in constant dollars). Economic activity is not the same as margin — but it wouldn’t be unfair to assign some 10 percent of that impact as a value-add. We’ve done that in our chart below. But individual investors, policymakers and technology developers will make their own choices on what to count. The bottom line For sure, it’s 54.40 or fight. Above the strict break-even with crude oil prices — that is, if your capex, opex, raw inputs and margin add up to more than 35.88 cents per pound today, or 54.40 cents per pound in 2040 — you’ll have a dogfight on your hands getting traction in the fuel markets. How much you want — or need to — lean on the impacts of emissions, energy security and economic development — well, it’s a tough call. In the case of economic development — what’s good for Iowa may not make you popular in Texas. What is good for the plant employee may not translate into a desire for In the case of carbon pricing — fickle friends you will find. Nevertheless there is value in avoiding emissions, generating energy security and stimulating local economic impact. Especially the latter — though it is felt most intensely quite close to the plant, and your offtake contracting would be most successful if it also was kept local. It may push you out to the higher-margin, lower-volume worlds of chemicals, fragrances, flavors, feed, lubricants and nutraceuticals. That’s where a lot of ventures working with algae and corn and cane sugars are generally heading now — though not all. There’s good reason to do so. Today, the price of cane sugar is running in the 15 cents per pound range, and corn starch is running in that region as well. But other forms of biomass look for more affordable — KiOR projects wood biomass in the 3 cent per pound range, as do POET-DSM and other makers of cellulosic ethanol from wheat straw and corn stover. The conversion rates are lower, the capex can be daunting, and there are limits to the ethanol market that are being tested now that pertain to the lack of flex-fuel vehicles — but you can see where the fuel arguments apply. Disclosure: None. Continue reading




