Taylor Scott International
CFI Nears One-Year Mark
31 Jul, 2013 03:30 AM MARK SIEBENTRITT THE Carbon Farming Initiative officially came to life about 12 months ago. And despite the uncertainty created by debates round Australia’s future carbon pricing legislation, the CFI is up and running and looks set to stay in some form post the next federal election. So how is it performing one year in? So far as I am aware, there are no indicators in place to judge progress with the CFI so I created a few of my own: are CFI methods being approved, are the methods getting used, and are Australian carbon credit units being issued? There would no doubt be others, but let’s take these as a start. In previous articles, I have discussed the importance of having relevant, CFI- approved methods in place. But to put it simply, without CFI methods there can be no approved projects and therefore no ACCUs generated. So how many approved CFI methods are there? When the scheme started in July, 2012, there were four approved methods, all of which had been developed by the Federal Government to get the CFI under way. Since this time, a further 16 have been approved, split equally between methods developed by the private sector and the Federal Government. Interestingly, the private-sector methods have focused solely on carbon sequestration through vegetation plantings, and avoided emissions from landfill. It could be argued that getting a method approved has been no simple task, with eight proposed methodologies not being accepted. This means that for every method proposed by the private sector and approved by the government, there is another that has been knocked back. So are the methods getting used and are we seeing projects approved? The answer is ‘yes’. At the time of writing this article, 69 projects had been approved by the Clean Energy Regulator. What is really interesting, is understanding which of the approved projects have had ACCUs issued to them. Of the 68 approved projects, only 22 have had ACCUs issued coming from only seven methods. What’s more, 87 per cent of all issued ACCUs have come from one method: the capture and combustion of methane in landfill gas from legacy waste. Furthermore, landfill related projects as a category account for 98pc of all ACCUs issued to date. All up, 1.75 million ACCUs have been issued in the first year. Applying a carbon price of $23.10 a tonne of CO2 equivalent equates to $40 million of carbon credits. While this is a good start, it’s worth remembering that this quantity of offsets equals about 0.5pc of the emissions generated by liable entities in Australia and even less of Australia’s total emissions. So if we scratch around behind the statistics what are some of the key learnings? First, emissions avoidance projects – especially landfill projects – are the front- runner in terms of generating revenue. This makes sense. Avoiding the emission of methane can result in a short turnaround time for generating ACCUs and has a 21 times multiplier in terms of generating carbon credits compared with storing carbon in trees or the soil because methane is a far more serious greenhouse gas. The approach is also well developed. Unlike some of the newer methods and thinking for generating offsets, the technology and many of the companies involved with the landfill-related projects have been around for at least two to three decades. Second, managed savannah burning has the potential to become popular and widespread in the short term. If we look at the number of projects per approved method, it is only second to the capture and combustion of methane in landfill gas from legacy waste. Because it is about avoided emissions, rather than sequestration, it also has the potential to generate revenue in the short term in the same way as landfill projects. Third, the private sector is embracing the concept of the CFI. While in the early part of 2012-13 it looked as if the Federal Government would drive development of all CFI methods, as described earlier the private sector has also chimed-in and over the course of the past year has proposed more methods in total than the Government. *Full report in Stock Journal , July 25 issue, 2013. Continue reading
A Look At South Africa’s Carbon Trading Potential
2 August 2013 – According to Glenn Hodes-senior program manager (UNEP), the carbon market in South Africa will help to level the playing field by making renewable projects more attractive to investors. Small-scale renewable projects (less than 50 MW) which are pursued in South Africa due to dispersed populations, have struggled to obtain finance from large companies and banks. However, with carbon trading, more attention will be brought to these projects. “This would certainly deal with the poverty issue more effectively as the power is closer to where the demand is,” Hodes says. But, how will carbon trading benefit South Africa’s renewable energy projects? Hodes says that if there is a price on carbon, whether through tax or a trading regime, private companies will be incentivised to invest in renewable energy projects and technology. “I think the private sector is for carbon trading. It sets a clear market signal.” But why hasn’t carbon trading taken off? Hodes blames this on uncoordinated attempts, regulatory and policy challenges. He explains that the implementation thereof and global connections can make it a challenge for carbon trading to work. There have also been circumstances under which baseline-and-credit CDM schemes have resulted in the maltreatment of indigenous peoples and their environment. There have also been cases of trade fraud and accounting discrepancies. Low levels of awareness as to how to access this market as well as a poorly resourced department are also to blame, according to the experts. South Africa has already missed a number of opportunities as it failed to capitalise on the first commitment period (2008 to 2012) of the Kyoto Protocol. Until the 17th international annual climate conference, COP17 in 2011, opportunity for South African carbon project developers was mostly to generate and sell carbon offsets (CERs). These CERs were sold from countries classified as developing countries to companies in developed countries which are bound by the emissions reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol to reduce annual greenhouse gas emissions. The Clean Development Mechanism has in the past given South Africa the opportunity to benefit from registering carbon credits or CERs. Other developing countries such as China, India and Brazil managed to register hundreds of emissions reduction projects under the CDM and got developed European countries to finance sustainable development in their countries. Currently, only 22 South African Project Design Documents (PDDs) have been registered by the CDM executive board as CDM projects, with only nine having actually issued CERs. In comparison to other developing countries, South Africa seems to have missed out on significant clean development opportunities. However, when the 2015 South African carbon tax comes in to effect, the demand for carbon credits via the voluntary market in South Africa will impact the country’s carbon trading. To ensure increased tax free thresholds, companies will be encouraged to reduce their CO2 emissions. To help them reduce their emissions to reduce tax liabilities, South African companies will most likely be able to purchase carbon credits from verifiable projects to offset a proportion of their carbon obligation. This means that there is scope for South African carbon projects to sell their credits in South Africa to local companies via a regional carbon trading scheme. There is talk that companies will be able to offset their tax liability by buying local carbon credits equivalent to 5% to 10% of their carbon tax liability. This will have an impact on the liquidity of the local market as a result of increased demand for local credits which will see a boost to local carbon project development. Continue reading
Permits To Pollute Can Be Bought Too Cheaply
Cheap emissions permits means industry hasn’t traded in its polluting ways. David Davies/PA When the carbon price collapsed to below €3 in April this year, EU policymakers sought to prop up carbon prices by a deal that would delay the release of carbon allowances (known as “backloading”). This deal was agreed by the European Parliament in July , but has had little impact – prices still languish at around €4-5, well below the highs of €30, the sort of level economists consider necessary to bring emissions under control. Is this a disaster? Does it mean the death of the carbon markets , as many have suggested ? A recent op-ed in the Financial Times made the case that prices do not matter much. The emissions trading scheme (ETS) simply ensures that Europe meets its emissions targets. A low carbon price is not necessarily a sign of trouble. In fact, if – it’s a big if – it’s the result of substantial, sustainable emissions reductions, a low price is a sign of success. But is the point of the ETS simply to ensure that a short-term cap is met? And if so, can the ETS be considered to be a success? Let’s look at the second question first – is the EU ETS making a major contribution to reducing short-term emissions at very low cost? Certainly, emissions are declining in Europe. The official numbers show that between 2005 and 2010, industries covered by the EU ETS cut their emissions by roughly 8% . The ETS is doing its job, one might conclude at first glance. However, those regulated by the ETS are, it turns out, no different to other polluters. Over the same period, total carbon emissions in the 27 EU member states fell by just over 8% , which implies there is little difference between those industries regulated by the ETS and those that are not. Two preliminary studies ( Jaraite and Di Maria, 2011 and Calel, 2013, forthcoming ) directly compare them, and neither uncovers any systematic difference. If the EU ETS isn’t doing the bulk of the work, what is driving the fall in emissions? Most studies (see, for instance, Anderson and Di Maria, 2011 ; Cooper, 2010 ; Kettner et al., 2011 ; Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 2009 ) suggest that the lion’s share of cuts has been driven by other factors such as the EU’s energy efficiency and renewables targets, the recession, and the high price of oil. The ETS has an impact too, but it cannot take credit for the majority of the cuts that have been achieved. Let’s now return to the first question – what is the point of the EU ETS? Certainly, a major objective is to ensure that a short-term cap is met. But another is to set the direction for the economic transition to a cleaner economy. What really matters is the total emissions produced up to 2050, not just those in the short term. And what matters greatly for the health of our economies is that this transition is undertaken gradually and smoothly. We don’t want to move too fast to begin with, but if we dawdle and move too slowly then a late rush to catch up and consequent upheavals will cost economies dearly. A carbon price of under €5 indicates that the system is sluggish – especially when such low prices can be seen to be the result of recession and financial crisis, not a miraculous decarbonisation of our economies. Even at these low prices, has the EU ETS sent a signal to businesses that the development of new low-carbon technologies is likely to yield profits in future? Encouraging evidence from some recent studies suggests that, though few in number, some businesses have invested more in R&D and patented more low carbon technologies. This innovation response seems strongest among those businesses that foresee the future will bring a high carbon price. So while the ETS is not the main driver of low carbon innovation – nor should it be – even in its current state it has encouraged some low carbon innovation. But instrumental to even this modest success, it seems, is that policymakers follow through on the promise that the trading scheme deliver a higher carbon price in the future. Where does that leave us? Should we worry about low carbon prices? Yes – the rock bottom carbon price is not a sign of success. It simply reflects a glut of permits on the market at a time of low economic activity – permits too numerous and cheap to force businesses to invest in innovative means to cut emissions. Low prices matter because they dampen the signal that low-carbon innovation will pay. The EU Parliament’s backloading measure does not directly address this, but it buys time for policymakers to cancel carbon allowances which would restore prices to higher levels. A higher carbon price would get the message to businesses that investment in decarbonisation is money well spent for the long term. When at last zero carbon technologies become economically competitive, we can celebrate the collapse of the carbon price. But that is likely to be some time into the future. Continue reading




